Introduction
Reducing the number of medical errors as a means of improving patient safety has been in the spotlight for over a decade now (e.g., Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000) . At the same time, hospitals, like other high-hazard industries, face the basic dilemma of "production versus protection" (Reason, 1997, p. 4) , i.e., providing quick and (cost-)effective treatment while ensuring patient safety and avoiding medical errors. In addition, pressure on hospitals towards efficiency and cost reduction has risen over the last years (Hsieh, Clement, & Bazzoli, 2010) , with potentially detrimental effects on safety (Hansez & Chmiel, 2010) as well as error-induced cost (van den Bos et al., 2011) .
One central determinant of medical error prevention consists in so-called safety culture , which is defined by a pioneer source as "the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation's safety management" (International Safety Advisory Group, 1991, p. 23) . A related construct is safety climate, which refers primarily to "the shared perceptions of employees concerning the degree to which safety is a top priority for employees within the organization" (Naveh, Katz-Navon, & Stern, 2011, p. 57 ).
Referring to the distinction made by Reason (1997) between error management tools (p. 130) and safety climate in the sense of shared values and attitudes (p. 194), we distinguish between two elements of safety culture -the abovementioned shared perceptions and attitudes concerning safety, hence termed safety climate (SC) and tangible, formalized safety procedures and tools (e.g., Critical Incident Reporting Systems (CIRS), checklists, barcodes, safety audits, or mission statements), hence termed safety tools (ST). This distinction between SC and ST is not always made in extant literature, with some authors seeing observable safety features as a part of safety climate both in theory on organizational culture and climate and empirical studies in healthcare and other fields (e.g., Katz-Navon, Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000; Ostroff, Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003) . Indeed, some ST like safety audits and mission statements are arguably quite closely related to the perception-and attitude-centered notion of safety climate, while others (e.g., checklists and barcodes) represent a much more tangible and procedural aspect of work design. One central distinction from SC, however, is that from a management perspective, all ST can be formally designed and implemented. This difference applies to several similar distinctions in related fields, too, like that between hard and soft aspects of Total Quality Management (e.g., Wilkinson, Redman, Snape, & [2] Marchington, 1998) and/or organizational culture (e.g., the 7S-model, with strategy, structure and systems as "hard" aspects and skills, style, staff, and shared values as "soft" aspects; e.g., Waterman, Peters, & Phillips, 1980) . It also relates to two different approaches to safety management in health care, where Neal et al. (2000) differentiate between safety compliance, which "involves adhering to safety procedures and carrying out work in a safe manner", and safety participation consisting of "helping coworkers, promoting the safety program within the workplace, demonstrating initiative, and putting effort into improving safety in the workplace" (p. 101). In a similar vein, Khatri et al. (2006) contrast control-based management with commitment-based management. The former is characterized, among other things, by an "emphasis on compliance/obedience" (p. 119) and a "bureaucratic, rule-based culture" (p. 125), aiming at regulation and standardization by a centralized quality department (Khatri, Brown, & Hicks, 2009) . By contrast, commitment-based management attaches importance to communication and teamwork, and makes "quality and safety issues permeate the entire organization" (Khatri et al., 2009, p. 318) . In spite of all these dichotomies represented by the mentioned concepts, these aspects (climate vs. tools, soft vs. hard, control/compliance vs. commitment/participation) are arguably not mutually exclusive, which raises the question to what extent the potential effects of these approaches are independent, antagonistic or mutually reinforcing.
Based on these considerations, our study investigates the following research questions: 1) How strongly does production pressure (reflected in higher capacity utilization and/or staff workload) affect error rate?
2) To what extent do safety tools (see above) affect error rate?
3) To what extent do shared perceptions and attitudes among frontline staff concerning safety (safety climate) affect error rate? 4) Do safety tools and safety climate interact in affecting error rate?
In investigating these questions, our study contributes to extant research in three ways. First, while the effect of safety culture/climate on patient safety has been previously examined, the influence of staff workload/capacity utilization as factors that are thought to adversely affect patient safety has hitherto rarely been investigated let alone directly compared with safety climate/safety tools as elements of safety culture that are thought to positively affect patient safety.
Second, it distinguishes between safety climate and safety tools as two elements of safety culture that represent different yet complimentary approaches to safety management and relates them to extant concepts of organizational and safety culture. Third, it consequently examines the main and interaction effects of these two elements (SC and ST) on patient safety as opposed to the influence of production pressure in a particularly error-prone medical specialty (intensive care).
[3]
Framework and hypotheses
Regarding the abovementioned conflict between production and protection, there are several approaches that aim at improving both safety and efficiency via process optimization, like Six Sigma, Lean Healthcare etc., and while some sources suggests that the conclusion regarding the overall benefit of Lean Healthcare implementation is somewhat sobering (Grove, Meredith, MacIntyre, Angelis, & Neailey, 2006; Radnor, Holweg, & Waring, 2012) , there are indeed successful instances in healthcare of reconciling these contradictory goals (Radnor, 2011, p. 4) .
One central determinant whether such initiatives are beneficial to patient safety or not is arguably whether the modified processes lead to a reduction in workload for frontline staff (e.g., via less red tape, smoother handovers, etc.) or rather increase workload and production pressure on staff in an effort to "do more with less". Several empirical findings suggest a tendency towards the latter in practice (Mehri, 2006; Schön, Bergquist, & Klefsjö, 2010) , suggesting that while efforts for increased efficiency need not necessarily lead to increased workload, in practice they apparently do (see also Rasmussen, 1997) , and indeed the premise that production pressure increases the rate of medical error is corroborated by several studies (e.g., Hansez & Chmiel, 2010; Valentin et al., 2009) . Hence, our first hypothesis:
H1: A higher degree of capacity utilization and/or workload is associated with a higher error rate.
Safety-related efforts, by contrast, contribute to increased safety margins (Rasmussen, 1997, p. 190) and should thus reduce the occurrence of errors. While this applies to both tools and climate, their pathways of effectiveness are arguably different (although not mutually exclusive).
Procedural tools like checklists and barcodes serve as "technical" barriers against errors. Those tools that are closer to the perception-related notion of safety climate (safety audits and mission statement) primarily represent an "official" and observable reflection of the prevailing safety climate. Finally, training and Critical Incident Reporting Systems (CIRS) emphasize the learning aspect of a safety culture and mainly aim at a better recognition of and appropriate response to identified threats to safety and/or sources of error. Indeed, the notion that safety tools reduce medical error is supported by empirical findings (Shojania, Duncan, McDonald, & Wachter, 2002) ; specifically for CIRS (Valentin et al., 2009) , audits and mission statements (Ovretveit, 1999) , or standard operating procedures for handovers (Catchpole et al., 2007) :
H2: Implementation of safety tools (ST) is associated with a lower error rate.
[4]
A good safety climate, on the other hand, establishes a priority for safety compared to efficiency goals (e.g., Zohar, 2000) and should thus contribute to less treatment errors as well, a notion supported by numerous studies (Clarke, 2006; Hofmann & Mark, 2006; Huang et al., 2010; Katz-Navon et al., 2005; Naveh et al., 2005 Naveh et al., , 2011 Neal & Griffin, 2006; Singer, Lin, Falwell, Gaba, & Baker, 2009; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) :
H3: A better safety climate (SC) is associated with a lower error rate.
Concerning the respective effectiveness of these two safety culture elements (ST vs. SC), several sources suggest that a formalized, control-based approach might not be as important a determinant of (patient) safety as an approach emphasizing shared views and social norms concerning safety among staff (Podgórski, 2010) , which applies to the medical field, too (Khatri, Halbesleben, Petroski, & Meyer, 2007; Waring, 2009 ). In addition, compared to other high-risk industries, work processes in health care depend to a greater extent on the decisions and discretion of frontline staff, with less reliance on automation and standardization (Gaba, 2000) , which further underlines the importance of an emphasis on safety among frontline staff for error prevention:
H4: SC reduces medical error more than ST.
Finally, we argue that safety tools and safety climate reinforce each other. For the "technical barrier" type of tools (checklists and barcodes), a good safety climate enhances compliance with safety procedures, strengthening their effectiveness. Safety tools that focus on learning (training and CIRS) provide increased knowledge and awareness about important threats and errors, adding to the attitudinal aspect represented by climate. Finally, safety tools that represent the observable complement of a good safety climate may degenerate into mere rhetoric and pretense in case of a weak safety climate (Naveh et al., 2011) :
H5: SC and ST interact in a mutually reinforcing way in their influence on error rate.

Method
Study design
The study was conducted as a joint research project by the Austrian Center for Documentation (Valentin et al., 2009; Valentin et al., 2006) . Required sample size was estimated beforehand based on expected effect sizes and validity of measures. Participating units could choose between two possible dates on which to begin a 48-hour observation period.
To avoid problems associated with the use of archive data (Clarke, 2006) , this study used a prospective approach to error measurement. Medical errors that actually or potentially caused harm to a patient were recorded over a 48-hour period (which included change of shift for nurses and physicians), with safety climate measured during that time, too. To approach the problem of variation across specialties, we focused on a particular medical field: intensive care units (ICUs).
Our choice was motivated by the fact that intensive care is particularly prone to error. The combination of complexity and potential for great harm makes it even more fraught with risk than other medical fields (Valentin et al., 2009) . A study of ICUs therefore seemed especially wellsuited to investigating the research questions set out above.
Sample
The final study sample consisted of 378 patients from 57 ICUs in as many (predominantly larger urban) hospitals. The data obtained during observation are summarized in Table 2 , in which the values of continuous variables are expressed as mean +/-standard deviation and those of categorical variables as frequencies and percentages. It is noteworthy that the overall mean NEMS score of 35.5 (±11.5) score points per patient suggests a high level of treatment intensity.
Figures for the safety climate dimensions are based on responses from 549 nurses and 185 physicians, representing response rates of 41.4% and 35.2%, respectively. Response rate standard deviation across ICUs is 17.7 %. ICUs with less than five respondents for the safety climate survey were excluded from the analyses. The mean age of respondents was 37.5 (±9.2) years and their mean professional experience 14.4 (±8.7) years. Some 17% of respondents had managerial functions. The following results are based on those 378 patients who remained in an ICU throughout the entire observation period. An analysis of patients with an observation time of at least 12 hours (795 in total) led to similar results and is therefore not reported.
[6] 
Data collection
A study manual and all questionnaires were made available in German on the study website (www.sifim.org). Detailed handbooks as well as simulated training sessions were provided to all participants. Additional support and supervision was offered during data collection. Data collection itself was highly standardized in order to reduce the risk of errors. For each patient observed, basic demographic characteristics (age, sex) were recorded by staff on a form, along with the start and end of the individual observation period. Throughout that time, the form remained at the patient position and was used to record the occurrence of any of the predefined medical errors relating to the patient concerned, irrespective of the staff member recording them. Every contributor to the questionnaire could see all previous entries, making duplicate reporting highly unlikely. In addition, each ICU staff member was asked to fill in the safety climate questionnaire available on the study website. For both patients and medical personnel, data acquisition and reporting were anonymous. Last but not least, the characteristics of individual ICUs were reported by a designated coordinator, who was also responsible for briefing the unit staff, facilitating data collection, and transmitting information to the study database.
Measures
Concerning the operationalization of "production pressure", our measure of capacity utilization was constructed from three separate indicators expressing the relation between patient numbers and resources, as follows:
• Unit occupancy, defined as the ratio of "bed usage" (sum of all hours of patient observation) to "bed potential" (number of ICU beds times 48, the observation period duration in hours);
• Nurse-to-patient ratio, defined as "total nurse working hours" (mean number of nurses times 48) divided by "bed usage";
• Physician-to-patient ratio, defined by analogy with 2.
Our workload measure was also composite and based on three indicators, in this case all concerned with the level of care provided per patient. They were:
• The number of medications received by patients in relation to nurse numbers
• The number of tubes, catheter, probes, lines and/or drains inserted into patients, again in relation to nurses.
• (Coyne, 2001; Hambleton, Merenda, & Spielberger, 2005) . This led to the development of the Vienna Safety Climate Questionnaire (VSCQ) in an iterative process using data from a total of 1,968 respondents and including multidimensional scaling (n = 61), item selection (n = 954, including an EFA sample with n = 107 and a first CFA sample with n = 847), confirmatory factor analysis (second CFA sample, recruited after final item selection n = 761), and validity (included in all samples). This process was completed before the current study was conducted.
Despite going beyond mere translation, the VCSQ is based on existing instruments for measuring safety climate (e.g., Colla et al., 2005; Flin, Despite considerable intercorrelations of the VSCQ scales (see Table 3 ), a confirmatory factor analysis based on three samples (total n = 2,608, with the sample used in the present study included) supports the posited dimensions and item allocation, with RMSEA ≤ .05 and χ2/df < 3.6 in all cases (Browne & Cudeck, 1993) . The questionnaire has been successfully validated (Steyrer, [9] Latzke, Pils, Vetter, & Strunk, 2011), and the performance of the VSCQ on relevant psychometric criteria (see Table 1 ) is so satisfactory that it is now listed in the catalogue of safety culture instruments used in member states of the European Union compiled by the European Network for Patient Safety.
Although safety climate was ascertained individually it represents a construct on group and/or organizational level (here: ICU); the same ultimately applies to error rate (Neal & Griffin, 2006) , with this study not focussing on the probability of an individual patient encountering a medical error but rather the performance of the whole ICU and its relationship to ICU-wide SC and ST. All analyses were therefore conducted at ICU level, with aggregated SC scale values. Table 1 shows the aggregation indices ICC(1), ICC(k) (notation follows McGraw & Wong, 1996) , and the interquartile range for r WG(J) for all scales. While using the uniform distribution as reference for the r WG(J) calculations makes them upper bound values (LeBreton & Senter, 2008) , these values as well as the ICC(k) values are well above the commonly cited threshold of 0.7, and ICC(1) well above 0.05 (Bliese, 2000; James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1993) , suggesting that analysis on an aggregate level is appropriate here. As regards our dependent variable, a medical error was defined, in line with previous studies on patient safety in ICUs, as an event that harmed or could have harmed a patient, whether by
[10] omission or commission (Thomas et al., 2000) . We focused on intensive care routine processes and recorded errors in seven distinct categories, based on insights from two previous studies (Valentin et al., 2009; Valentin et al., 2006) Naveh et al., 2005) .
Based on the correlation results presented in Table 3 we chose the predictors for the regression analyses, with a focus on keeping the models parsimonious and minimizing multicollinearity. In order to test H4 we conducted Steiger's Z-test (Steiger, 1980) comparing the (bivariate) effect of safety climate on error rate to that of the safety tools.
Findings
Bivariate analysis reveals a high intercorrelation between capacity utilization and workload (0.72) and of both with error rate (capacity utilization: 0.25, workload: 0.40), which is why we only retained workload as a predictor for the following regression analyses. Similarly, while all safety climate scales are significantly correlated with error rate, the high intercorrelations of the VSCQ scales prompted us to choose Attitude towards Safety Management as safety climate proxy for the regression analyses, since this VSCQ dimension corresponds most closely to the definition of safety climate presented above.
[11] The intercorrelations concerning the use of safety tools are generally much lower, so we conducted separate analyses for each safety tool to assess the respective impact of workload, safety attitudes and each safety tool on error rate. We ran additional analyses including the number of safety tools as a predictor, but this was merely correlated with the individual ST and (like mission statements, albeit more weakly) with two SC scales (management commitment and organizational learning) but not with either capacity utilization, workload, or error rate. Based on the finding by Katz et al. (2005) that in contrast to "optimal" level of detail of safety procedures both scarcely and overly detailed safety procedures lead to a higher error rate, we checked for a curvilinear relationship between number of tools and error rate, too, but found none. Table 4 presents the results of the regression analyses with error rate always the dependent variable, and workload, Attitude towards Safety Management, its interaction with the respective safety tool and the safety tool main effect as predictors. Both correlation and regression results support H1 and H3 (workload increases the error rate, safety climate reduces it) but strongly contradict H2: none of the examined safety tools significantly reduces error rate. More precisely, there was no significant relationship with error rate for any of the ST, except for a marginally significant (2-tailed p < .10) main effect of safety audits opposite to the predicted direction. Concerning H5, the results do not support our assumption. There was just one merely marginally significant interaction with audits in the predicted direction (one-tailed p < .08), and even a "reversed" interaction with barcodes opposite to our assumption (two-tailed p < .07),
suggesting that barcodes even contribute to an increased error rate in case of a good safety climate.
Limitations
While the present study has some strengths, e.g., a prospective designs in which accidents were measured following the measurement of safety climate (Clarke, 2006) , considering safety climate at the clinical area level rather than at the hospital level (Sexton et al., 2006) , an absence of common method variance, and the introduction of a now recognized German instrument for measuring safety climate that can relate to tried and tested instruments for measuring safety climate in English (e.g., Schutz et al., 2007; Singer et al., 2007) , it has some shortcomings that should be considered when interpreting the results, too. First, it is not based on a random sample:
units were self-selecting in that they chose to respond to the call for participation and had previous experience with external studies on medical error in ICUs (Valentin et al., 2009; Valentin et al., 2006) , although not in connection with safety climate and/or tools. As a result, the possibility of sample bias cannot be completely excluded, but such a bias should rather consist in more accurate reporting of errors and a better (and/or bounded below) safety climate compared to "average" ICUs, which would not weaken our results. Moreover, despite an ex-ante research design controlling for a range of variables and modeling the project on state-of-the-art studies in the areas of error and safety culture measurement which enabled us to include a great number of potential error rate predictors, some degree of distortion from omitted variables cannot be entirely ruled out.
Concerning staff workload during the observation period, we were unable to record the precise number and time of individual treatments (i.e., the exact distribution of workload) and therefore have to assume that these were approximately evenly distributed.
Other conceivable causes of distortion lie in the methods we used to measure safety performance and safety climate. Our metric of the former was based on a limited set of error types.
While these were selected for being the most important ones according to previous studies in ICUs (Valentin et al., 2009; Valentin et al., 2006) , the inclusion of other types might have produced different results. In addition, error incidence was recorded by hospital staff, therefore it is possible that some over-or underreporting occurred, although the high values recorded make underreporting appear somewhat implausible. Similarly, the VSCQ relies on employees responding in a valid and truthful manner, something which cannot be guaranteed; on the other hand, the obtained values do not hint at any biases like social desirability or similar and the data were regularly verified and checked for any apparent inconsistencies during the execution of the study.
Discussion and Practice Implications
Our findings for hospital care in ICUs support the notion of a production vs. protection tradeoff in two ways. First, while it is arguably possible to implement measures that increase both efficiency and safety (as mentioned above in connection with Lean Healthcare), simply aiming at "doing more with less" obviously comes with a safety penalty, as reflected in the considerable effect of staff workload on error rate. Second, safety culture can apparently thwart the detrimental effects of increased workload on safety quite effectively. However, corroborating the findings by Khatri et al. (2007) , a management approach relying on safety tools and procedures to compensate for the erosion of safety margins by increased production pressure might rather abet than abate medical errors.
Regarding any interaction between safety climate and safety tools, our findings were generally weak. For the two "climate-related" tools (mission statements and safety audits), only the
implementation of a mission statement was significantly correlated with some of the SC dimensions, and interactions with safety climate, although in the predicted direction, failed to reach statistical significance for our sample. The same applies to an even larger extent to the safety tools aimed at learning and increased awareness (training and CIRS), where no interaction was found at all. Concerning training as ascertained in our study, we argue that it consists mainly in off-the-job "ground school" lessons, representing individual "single-loop learning" which is just a precursor of "double-loop learning" that takes place and becomes effective on an organizational level (Argyris, 1982) . CIRS, on the other hand, represents such double-loop learning, but still failed to interact with safety climate in the predicted way. One possible explanation for this is that CIRS in hospitals is still in a somewhat exploratory phase, especially that staff might not (yet) trust it to be positively anonymous and non-punitive, since it is administered and evaluated by management. A similar observation was made in another high-hazard industry, where the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), now a valued and effective safety tool, initially failed to work until its anonymity and non-punitive nature were clearly and credibly established by introducing a neutral organization functioning as a broker, with the supervisory authorities having strictly no access to any clues concerning the identity of the reporting persons (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2011, p. 57f.) .
By contrast, checklists and barcodes address daily work routines in a highly structured and rigid manner. Here, the marginally significant interaction found in our data for use of barcodes (i.e., it lowers the error rate in case of a poor SC but contributes to an augmentation of errors in
ICUs with a good SC) may hint at staff not using the implemented technology in case of a weak safety climate, therefore detecting less errors, while in case of a sound safety climate, staff may be more likely to use the available technology because they recognize its role in promoting safety, and, as a result, detect more errors. Another possible explanation relating to the finding by KatzNavon et al. (2005) that overly detailed safety procedures increase the number of medical errors could be that in units with a firm safety attitude the implementation of barcodes represents an additional burden (despite falling slightly short of statistical significance for two-tailed testing, barcodes are the only ST with an appreciable relationship to workload and capacity utilization) but actually serves as a barrier against errors in the absence of such an emphasis on safety. The failure to find any comparable (or contrasting) effect for checklists might be largely rooted in the fact that almost all participating ICUs used checklists (see bottom of Table 2 ), making this safety tool more of a constant than a variable.
In conclusion, besides underscoring the importance of a sound safety climate to prevent a decline in patient safety resulting from increased production pressure, our findings support the [15] view that safety is created at the "sharp end" (Dekker, 2006) , consequently strongly cautioning against a "shortcut" approach of trying to achieve safety via prodecures and policies implemented top-down.
